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Abstract. We examine systemic risk in the Chinese banking system by estimating the conditional 
value at risk (CoVaR), the marginal expected shortfall (MES), the systemic impact index (SII) and 
the vulnerability index (VI) for 16 listed banks in China for the 2007-2014 period. We find that 
these measures show different patterns, capturing different aspects of systemic risk of Chinese 
banks. However, rankings of banks based on these measures are significantly correlated. The time 
series results for the CoVaR and MES measures suggest that systemic risk in the Chinese banking 
system decreased after the global financial crisis but started rising in 2014.  
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1. Introduction 
Macro-prudential regulation, which aims to reduce systemic risk and achieve financial stability, 
has been one of the most important policy innovations after the global financial crisis (Kim and 
Chey, 2010; Blinder et al., 2016). However, to implement such regulation, policymakers need to 
identify systemic risk in the banking system. This paper analyzes systemic risk in the Chinese 
banking system. China has achieved remarkable progress in reforming its banking system. 
Currently, there are 117 Chinese banks in the 2015 Top 1000 World Banks ranking;1 three of them 
(the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of 
China)2 are rated as global systemically important banks. Chinese banks made $292 billion in 
aggregate pretax profit in 2013, or 32% of total earnings of the world’s top 1,000 banks, 
                                                             
1
 See report published on 29 June, 2015 in The Banker, available at http://www.thebanker.com/Top-1000-
World-Banks/Top-1000-World-Banks-China-s-banks-show-no-signs-of-slowdown. 
2
 See the 2014 update of the list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), 6 November 2014, available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/11/2014-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks/. 
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outperforming US banks (with a share of 20%), according to The Banker magazine.3 However, 
the Chinese banking system faces numerous challenges. Economic growth in China has been 
slowing down since the global financial crisis and its export-led growth path does not seem 
sustainable (Aizenman, 2015), overcapacity in some sectors is becoming increasingly serious, and 
there seems to be a bubble in the real estate market, whose financing mainly depends on banking 
loans. No doubt, these challenges may affect the stability of the banking system.4 Furthermore, 
the rapid expansion of China’s shadow-banking sector may pose a threat to banking stability (Li, 
2014), as illustrated by the default (or near-default) of several trusts exposed to the coalmining 
sector in 2014.5 Banks are not immune to the risks of the shadow-banking sector, as many of 
them distribute wealth management products or refinance trust companies.  
A banking crisis in China would create enormous problems not only in China but also in other 
countries (see Feldkircher and Korhonen (2014) and Qiu and Zhan (2016) for evidence on China’s 
increasing influence on the global economy). It therefore seems wise to nip the risk in the bud. 
And for this we need to analyze systemic risk objectively and accurately. According to official 
reports, the ratio of non-performing loans is about 1% for the vast majority of banks, indicating a 
good health of the banking system. However, China’s official figures are often of questionable 
reliability, as argued by Krugman (2011). Therefore, our research resorts to market data, providing 
a more objective analysis of the soundness of the Chinese banking system. 
We investigate systemic risk via several measures. More specifically, we apply the conditional 
value at risk (CoVaR) measure of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), the marginal expected 
shortfall (MES) measure of Acharya et al. (2010), the systemic impact index (SII) and the 
vulnerability index (VI) of Zhou (2010) to 16 listed banks in China for the 2007-2014 period.6 
The former two are widely used to monitor financial institutions by central bankers and bank 
regulators and have a high impact in academia (Benoit et al., 2013). The latter two are based on a 
                                                             
3
 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/us-banks-rankings-china-idUSKBN0F411520140629. 
4
 As Fenech et al. (2014) point out, loan quality of the Chinese banking system is directly linked to real estate and 
government supported infrastructure projects. Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) also find that house price fluctuations 
contribute to bank instability. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008) find that 
macroeconomic conditions have a significant effect on banks’ performance. 
5
 See www.thebanker.com/Top-1000-World-Banks/Top-1000-World-Banks-2014-Back-on-track. 
6 We also consider the SRISK approach of Brownlees and Engle (2012) but we find that this approach may not 
applicable to Chinese banks because the results are zero for all banks considered in the 2007-2010 period, which 
seems counter intuitive. We provide details of the SRISK measure in an online Appendix. 
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different estimation method (namely, Extreme Value Theory). These measures, calculated using 
daily equity returns, are used to capture each bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
We find that the four measures of systemic risk diverge, as they capture different aspects of 
systemic risk in the banking system. However, the rankings of banks based on these measures are 
significantly correlated. Moreover, the time series results for the CoVaR and MES measures 
suggest that systemic risk in the Chinese banking system decreased after the global financial crisis 
but started rising in 2014. We also compare our findings for Chinese banks with similar results for 
Korean banks, and find that Chinese banks have higher ∆CoVaR and lower MES than Korean 
banks, suggesting that the Chinese banking system is systemically riskier but individual banks 
seem to be more capable of avoiding losses from distress in the banking system. 
Our paper contributes to the academic literature on the Chinese banking system. In the past 
decade, several papers have been published, analyzing different aspects of the Chinese banking 
system. To name a few, Hasan et al. (2015) investigate the Chinese banking structures and their 
effect on small business development; Garcia-Herrero et al. (2006), Fu and Heffernan (2009), Lin 
and Zhang (2009), and Dong et al. (2016) focus on the reform and performance of the Chinese 
banking system; Berger et al. (2009), Ariff and Luc (2008), and Asmild and Matthews (2012) 
investigate the efficiency of Chinese banks; while Bailey et al. (2012) and Fenech et al. (2014) 
investigate the quality of bank loans and some other characteristic of the Chinese banking system. 
However, only a few studies investigate systemic risk in the Chinese banking system. Chen et al. 
(2014) apply an indicator-based approach proposed by the Basel Committee to identify domestic 
systemically important banks (D-SIBs) and analyze their correlation with non-D-SIBs. Wang et al. 
(2015) employ a Merton model to estimate the default probability of banks to construct a systemic 
risk index of banks. Gang and Qian (2015) examine the impact of China’s monetary policy on 
systemic risk, using CoVaR. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that constructs 
multiple measures of systemic risk for Chinese banks. We also compare systemic risk of Chinese 
banks to that of banks in Korea. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the Chinese banking system. 
Section 3 introduces the systemic risk measures and describes the data. Section 4 provides the 
results. Section 5 concludes and discusses. 
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2. A brief review of the Chinese banking system 
In the 1990s, the banking system in China was dominated by four large state-owned banks. In 
addition, there were 13 joint-stock banks and 18 city commercial banks. However, the four 
state-owned big banks faced serious problems, such as high non-performing loans and inefficient 
operation and management. The Chinese authorities learned their lessons from the Asian financial 
crisis, initiating a series of reforms on the banking system in 2003; the first step was the 
restructuring of the state-owned commercial banks.  
The successful reform of the Bank of China (BOC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB), 
two of the four state-owned banks, which consisted of disposing of non-performing assets, 
establishing modern corporate governance frameworks and introducing strategic investors, was 
followed by reform of the other two state-owned banks, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). The four state-owned banks became 
joint-stock commercial banks and they have been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 
2006. Reforms were also implemented in other small and medium-sized commercial banks and 
rural credit cooperatives since 2003.7  
After the reform, the Chinese banking system became more and more comprehensive and 
diversified, playing a dominated role in the Chinese financial system. At the end of 2013, it 
comprised of three development banks, five large-scale commercial banks, 12 joint-stock 
commercial banks, 145 city commercial banks, 468 rural commercial banks, 122 rural cooperative 
banks, 1803 rural credit cooperatives, 1134 new rural financial institutions, one postal savings 
bank, and 92 branches of foreign banks or non-bank financial institutions, according to the 
classification and statistics of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the 
People's Bank of China (PBC). 8  According to the Chinese Financial Stability Reports 
(2009-2014), the banking system accounted for more than 90% of total asset of all financial 
intermediation since 2008. Besides, total assets, liabilities and profits of the Chinese banking 
                                                             
7
 For further details of the reform process of Chinese banks we refer to García Herrero et al. (2004), García 
Herrero et al. (2006), Podpiera (2006), Fu and Heffernan (2009), and Lin and Zhang (2009). 
8
 Data sources: “The Agenda of Regulatory Statistical Information in 2014, Scope of Institutions and Indi
cator’s Explanation”, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/DF50505B98DF45E1916AEC2BBCD55E1
E.html; “China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2013”, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/hom
e/docView/3C28C92AC84242D188E2064D9098CFD2.html; and “China Financial Stability Report 2014”, htt
p://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/jinrongwendingju/369/index.html.  
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system grew rapidly since 2003. Total assets and total liabilities grew from 28 trillion Yuan and 27 
trillion Yuan in 2003 to 151 trillion Yuan and 141 trillion Yuan in 2013 with an average growth 
rate of 18% (see Figure 1). Profits before taxes of the banking system grew from 32 million Yuan 
in 2003 to 338 million Yuan in 2006 with an average growth rate of 119%, while the profit after 
tax of the banking system grew from 447 million Yuan in 2007 to 1744 million Yuan in 2013, with 
an average growth rate of 25% (see Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
 
Although the Chinese banking system was becoming diversified, it was still dominated by 
several big banks. For example, five large-scale commercial banks accounted for 43% of total 
assets of the Chinese banking system at the end of 2013 and 12 joint-stock commercial banks for 
18% (see Figure 3). The after-tax profits of the Chinese banking system had a similar distribution 
as banking assets. In 2013, the five large-scale commercial banks accounted for 48% of total 
after-tax profits and the 12 joint-stock commercial banks for 17% (see Figure 4).  
 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here] 
 
3. Methodology and data 
Several measures of systemic risk have been developed since the global financial crisis (Bisias et 
al. (2012) provide a detailed overview of 31 quantitative measures of systemic risk). These 
measures mainly rely on market data, as they are believed to effectively reflect information about 
publicly traded firms.9 Lo (2008) and Bisias et al. (2012) suggest to analyze systemic risk based 
on multiple measures rather than on a single measure, because the banking system is complex and 
dynamic, while no single measure is able to capture all aspects of systemic risk. Following this 
suggestion, in this paper the conditional value at risk (CoVaR) measure, the marginal expected 
                                                             
9
 We focus on measures relying on stock returns because the CDS market in China is still under development and 
there is not enough data for our purposes. In September 2016, the Chinese government approved trading of CDS 
by financial institutions in the nation’s interbank market (See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016- 
09-22/china-said-to-allow-trading-of-cds-in-nation-s-interbank-market-ite5sevj). As for the Chinese stock market, 
it has become fairly efficient after the reform in 2005-2006 (see Wang et al., 2010; Patel et al., 2012; Chong et al., 
2012). 
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shortfall (MES), the systemic impact index (SII) and the vulnerability index (VI) are applied to the 
Chinese banking system.  
We choose these four measures of systemic risk because they have been widely used in recent 
years, both in academia and regulatory institutions. Besides, they capture systemic risk from 
different angles. CoVaR and SII aim to detect the spillover effects from a bank’s distress to the 
banking system whereas MES and VI are designed to evaluate a bank’s fragility by calculating the 
expected loss or the probability of distress of the bank when the banking system is confronted with 
distress. CoVaR and SII appear as the appropriate measures for systemic risk triggered by a single 
bank, according to their definition. MES and VI reverse the conditioning and shift the focus to a 
particular bank’s fragility conditional on market distress. Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and 
Engle (2012) argue that only when the market is in distress, individual banks’ distress can have 
severe consequences for the financial system. Therefore, MES and VI can also serve as systemic 
risk measures.  
 
3.1 CoVaR: definition and estimation 
CoVaR, short for value at risk of the financial system conditional on institutions being under 
distress, has been proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), henceforth AB. They define an 
institution’s contribution to systemic risk as the difference between the CoVaR conditional on the 
institution being under distress and the CoVaR conditional on the institution being in normal state. 
Note that the value at risk of institution i ( ) can be defined as: 
P	 ≤   = ,                              (1) 
where 	 is the return of institution i and   is the Value-at-Risk of institution i at quantile q 
in a given time horizon. As a result, the | can be expressed as the q-quantile of the 
conditional probability distribution: 
P	 ≤ |	 = ,  = ,                        (2) 
where ,| is denoted by the VaR of system s conditional on the institution i being in its 
VaR. Thus, the contribution of institution i to the risk of system s is denoted by 
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∆| = |
 − | !"#,                 (3) 
where ∆| is the contribution of institution i to the systemic risk of the system. AB use 
the median return of institution i as a proxy of a normal state of institution i. 
Girardi and Tolga Ergun (2013) modify AB’s CoVaR through assuming that the conditioning 
financial distress event refers to the return of institution i being at most at its VaR ( ≤ ) as 
opposed to being exactly at its VaR ( = ). Thus, Equation 2 is replaced by: 
P	 ≤ |	 ≤ ,  = .                        (4) 
This specification has three advantages over AB’s CoVaR. First, it allows us to consider more 
severe distress events of institution i that are further away in the tail (beyond its VaR). In addition, 
it improves the consistency of CoVaR with respect to the conditional dependence of the system on 
individual institutions (Mainik and Schaanning, 2014). Lastly, due to the time-varying correlation 
between an institution and the system in Girardi and Tolga Ergun’s (2013) CoVaR, it allows the 
linkage to be changing over time while this is assumed to be constant in AB.  
Therefore, we adopt the version of Girardi and Tolga Ergun (2013) and calculate the CoVaR 
metric following their three-step procedure. Firstly, we calculate VaR of each bank i based on a 
GARCH(1,1) model and secondly, using the DCC(1,1) model we estimate the bivariate density of 
each bank and the system.10 After these two steps, we can calculate CoVaR at the distressed state 
(q=0.05)11 and at the benchmark state ($ − % ≤ 	 ≤ $ + %) from the dual integral equations 
(5) and (6): 
' ' ()*+,, -))-), = .,/0123,/
4|
01 ,                      (5) 
                                                             
10
 We choose the GARCH(1,1) and DCC(1,1) specifications following Engle’s suggestion that these best fit most 
financial time series. The dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model has been introduced by Engle (2002). We 
adopt this model to obtain the time-varying correlation between returns of the system and the institution. Notice 
that we estimate their correlation rather than their causal relationship, and the DCC model has taken into account 
the variables’ autocorrelation. Thus, ∆CoVaR is just a tail-dependency measure and does not necessarily reflect 
causality (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016). This argument also holds for the MES measure as discussed in Section 
3.2. 
11
 In practice, the quantiles of 0.05 and 0.01 are widely used to weigh the extreme risk of a bank. We adopt the 
quantile of 0.05 for two reasons: 1) since banking crises have not occurred in China, there are too few observations 
in the tail distributions of banks’ return at quantile 0.01; 2) papers used to compare our findings for the Chinese 
banking system with those of other countries also use the 0.05 quantile. 
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' ' ()*+,, -))-), = (5/67/5/07/
23,/4|01 ,                      (6) 
where ()*+,, -) is the joint probability density function of x and y at time t, and ( = 8+$ −
% ≤ 	 ≤ $ + %). 
Finally, ∆CoVaR is the percentage difference between the CoVaR at the distressed state and at 
the benchmark state, as defined in Equation (7): 
∆,| = 100 × +,| − ,|<)/,|<.              (7) 
Thus, ∆CoVaR reflects the spillover effect from a bank to the system, indicating the percentage 
change of VaR of the system when the bank being in distress and in normal state. 
 
3.2 MES: definition and estimation 
Acharya et al. (2010) consider a financial institution’s contribution to systemic risk as its expected 
loss when the market declines substantially. Under the definition of VaR in Eq. (1), the expected 
shortfall (ES), which is the expected loss conditional on something bad happening, can be defined 
as follows: 
>?@ = >[| ≤ @].                           (8) 
In order to get a bank’s marginal expected shortfall (MES), define R as the total return of the 
banking system and decompose it into the sum of each bank’s return (	), that is  = ∑ -	 , 
where - is the weight of bank i in the banking system. Then we have: 
>?@ = ∑ ->[	| ≤ @] ,                        (9) 
and 
D>?@ = EFGHEI = E[	| ≤ @].                       (10) 
Thus, D>?@  measures bank i’s average equity return on days when the return of the entire 
banking system drops below a threshold (i.e. @). 
In Acharya et al. (2010), a bank’s MES is the average return of its equity (<) during the 5% 
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worst days for the overall market return (K), where the market is presented by the CRSP Value 
Weighted Index or the financial subsector’s index: 
D>? = L#MK<!	3O	P!	Q%	S3	"I∑ ,{:I!K		#		Q%	V} .       (11) 
This method is simple but it may not get sound results when there are few extreme events in the 
tail of the return distribution. Furthermore, Acharya et al. (2010) assume the probability of 
observing a conditioning event to be constant, which is somewhat far from reality as it is more 
probable to observe losses beyond a given threshold when the volatility is higher. Brownlees and 
Engle (2012) propose an alternative method to calculate MES which might overcome these 
shortcomings. Therefore, we adopt Brownlees and Engle’s method to calculate MES via the 
following three steps: 1) Modeling volatilities by GARCH models to obtain conditional volatility 
and standardized residuals; 2) Resorting to a DCC specification to obtain conditional correlation 
and the standardized idiosyncratic firm residual; 3) Inference on the model innovations is based on 
the GARCH/DCC residuals. The one period ahead MES can be expressed as: 
D>?0L| = %,X,>0LY,|Y, ≤ ,/%, + %,Z1− X,. >0L+[,|Y, ≤ ,/%,), (12) 
where, E() is the tail expectation of the standardized innovations distribution, X is the dynamic 
conditional correlation between bank i and system s, % and % are time-varying conditional 
standard deviations. We only need to estimate the tail expectations of the standardized innovations 
distribution because the dynamic conditional correlation and conditional standard deviations have 
been calculated from the GARCH/DCC model in the previous sub-section. Following Brownlees 
and Engle (2012), we resort to a nonparametric kernel estimation approach to compute the tail 
expectations. Let 
\P+t) = ' ^+_))_/P01 ,                              (13) 
where k(u) is a kernel function and h is a positive bandwidth. Then  
>`PY,|Y, ≤ ^ = ∑ a4,/bc+a4,/0d)
efg
#hic ,                       (14) 
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and 
>`P[,jY, ≤ ^ = ∑ k4,/bc+a4,/0d)
efg
#hic ,                      (15) 
where	(̂P = ∑ bc+a4,/0d)
efg
# . Thus, MES reflects the vulnerability of individual banks, indicating the 
expected loss of individual banks conditional on the system being in distress.  
 
3.3 SII and VI: definition and estimation 
We introduce the SII and the VI measures together in this section because they have some 
common backgrounds and estimation methods. The SII and VI measures have been developed by 
Zhou (2010) through extending the concept of the “probability that at least one bank becomes 
distressed” (PAO) in Segoviano and Goodhart (2009). According to Zhou (2010), SII measures the 
expected number of bank failures in the banking system given that one particular bank fails, 
whereas VI measures the probability that a particular bank fails when there is at least one other 
failure in the system. Thus, SII and VI are defined by Equation (16) and Equation (17), 
respectively: 
?mm+() = > ∑ 1nopo+h)|q > +()"sL ,                       (16) 
where 1t is the indicator function that is equal to 1 when A holds, and is 0 otherwise; and 
m+() = 8q > +()|u∃w ≠ y,			z. |.		qs > s+()}.                  (17) 
Zhou (2010) uses extreme value theory (EVT) to compute the SII and the VI. Suppose 
+qL, q.,⋯ , q") follows the multivariate EVT setup, then we have 
?mm = limh→ ?mm+() = ∑ +2 − ,s+1,1))"sL ,                      (18) 
and 
m = limh→ m+() = g+L,L,⋯,L)6L0+L,L,⋯,L)g+L,L,⋯,L) .                     (19) 
where +1,1,⋯ ,1) is the L function characterizing the tail dependence of +qL, q.,⋯ , q"), and 
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+1,1,⋯ ,1) is the L function capturing the tail dependence of +qL,⋯ , q0L, q6L,⋯q"). More 
details about the L function and the derivation of equations (18) and (19) are provided in de Haan 
and Ferreira (2007) and Zhou (2010). Before obtaining the results of SII and VI, we need to 
estimate the L function. According to Zhou (2010), a counting measure12 is applied to estimate 
the +1,1,⋯ ,1), then we have 
`+1,1,⋯ ,1) = Ld∑ 1∃L",	z. |. q > q,#0d#L .                   (20) 
In equation (20), a critical issue is the choice of the value of k. Zhou (2010) suggests to calculate 
the estimator of L(1,1,…1) under different k values and draw a line plot against the k values, then 
picking the first stable part of the line plot starting from low k, which balances the trade-off 
between the variance arising from low k values and the bias arising from high k values. Following 
this procedure, we finally choose k = 60, which corresponds to a p of 3.4%. Thus, SII reflects the 
spillover effect from a bank to other banks, indicating the expected number of distressed banks 
when a particular bank becomes distressed. The VI mirrors a bank’s capacity to cope with shocks 
from other banks’ failures by calculating the probability of failure of a particular bank. 
 
3.4 Sample and data summary 
We investigate systemic risk of Chinese banks employing the different measures introduced above 
using time series data of 14 commercial banks’ equity price during September 25, 2007- 
December 31, 2014. We focus on 14 banks because there are only 16 banks listed in China’s stock 
exchange and two of them are listed only since 2010 (the Agricultural Bank of China and the 
China Everbright Bank). The chosen period depends on data availability and our goal to use a long 
time period in order to observe the dynamics of banks’ systemic risk before and after the global 
financial crisis. We also compute systemic risk of the other two banks during September 1, 2010 
to December 31, 2014. Although there are only 16 (14) banks investigated, they capture a 
substantial part of the banking system in China in view of their dominant position. The 16 banks 
include five large-scale commercial banks, eight national joint-stock commercial banks and three 
city joint-stock commercial banks according to the classification of the China Banking Regulatory 
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 For more details about the counting measure, see van Oordt and Zhou (2012). 
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Commission. Their combined assets account for more than 79% of all commercial banks. 
Data for equity prices of banks is obtained from TDX13, as are data of the banking sector index 
(BSI). The summary statistics for the banks and the BSI are listed in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, 
average equity returns of all banks nearly equal 0, which indicates that our assumption of zero 
mean return is valid for the data set employed. We also observe that all daily returns exhibit high 
kurtosis and skewness compared with the kurtosis and skewness from the normal distribution, 
which are 3 and 0.  
 
  [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Results and analysis 
This section first presents the results for the four measures of systemic risk. Then we compare the 
rankings of banks under these four measures. Furthermore, we link our findings for Chinese banks 
to systemic bank risk estimations for Korea to get a better understanding of the degree of systemic 
risk in the Chinese banking system. 
 
4.1 Results for ∆CoVaR 
Table 2 shows the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) between each bank and the banking 
system, the value at risk (VaR) at the 5% quantile of each bank and the ∆CoVaR of each bank 
during the whole sample period. The average DCC of all banks is above 0.8 (see Column 7 in 
Table 2), indicating strong links between each bank and the banking system, which implies that 
distress in one bank will easily propagate to other banks. Corresponding to the strong links, we 
find that the ∆CoVaR is associated with the DCC while the VaR (5%) is not. The cross-section 
correlation coefficient between banks’ average ∆CoVaR and their average DCC is as high as 0.99, 
while it is negative (-0.11) for banks’ VaR (5%) with their average DCC. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
                                                             
13
 TDX (also called Tong Da Xin Financial Terminal) is software provided for analyzing the Chinese stock market. 
All equity price data can be downloaded from TDX. To exclude the effect of dividend, we employ adjusted closing 
prices from TDX. 
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We find that SPDB has the highest mean of ∆CoVaR among the 16 banks, indicating the highest 
systemic risk contribution. The value of its ∆CoVaR tells us that distress of SPDB (when its return 
is below 5% VaR) on average increases the VaR of the banking system by 166.9% compared to a 
normal situation for the SPDB.  
Table 3 shows the ranking of banks according to their ∆CoVaR for different periods. We 
separate the whole sample period into two periods (2007-2010 and 2011-2014), because the equity 
price data of ABC and CEB are only available since September 2010. Thus, the rankings for the 
first and second period are not completely comparable. The rankings of most of banks hardly 
change during 2007 to 2010 while they change dramatically between 2011 and 2014. This 
suggests that the banking system has undergone some changes since the global financial crisis (for 
example, see Cheung et al., 2016). 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Furthermore, we consider the relation of ∆CoVaR with bank size (measured by assets). We 
calculate Spearman rank’s correlation between the banks’ yearly average ∆CoVaR and their assets 
and do the same for the different periods. The last row of Table 3 shows the results. The 
correlation between the ranking based on average ∆CoVaR and that based on asset size drops from 
0.57 in first period to 0.34 in the second period. The yearly correlation tends to decrease between 
2009 and 2013, suggesting that bank size plays a smaller role in determining banks’ systemic risk 
contribution during the post-crisis years, but it increases dramatically in 2014. Still, the 
coefficients are lower than 0.5 in most of years, indicating that the link between bank size and 
∆CoVaR is not very strong. For example, the coefficient is only 0.06 in 2013. This result reminds 
us that a relatively small bank can also exert a significant effect on the banking system’s stability.  
Finally, we divide the banks into three groups according to the classification of the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission and calculate their average ∆CoVaR. The Big-5 includes five 
large-scale commercial banks, the National-8 includes eight national joint-stock commercial banks 
and the City-3 includes three city joint-stock commercial banks. As shown in Table 4, we find that 
the Big-5’s average ∆CoVaR ranks first in both the first period (2007-2010) and in the second 
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period (2011-2014). The mean values of ∆CoVaR for the Big-5 and the National-8 decrease in the 
second period compared to the first period, whereas that of City-3 basically remains the same in 
the second period. As a result, the average ∆CoVaR for City-3 ranks second in the second period. 
∆CoVaR is the highest in 2008 for all three groups and tends to decrease slowly in the following 
four years. However, the average ∆CoVaR of the Big-5 tends to increase in 2013 and 2014, 
becoming almost as high as in 2008. In contrast, the average ∆CoVaR of the National-8 and City-3 
are lower, both compared to their own past levels and to the Big-5. Finally, we perform a t-test for 
equality of means of different groups’ ∆CoVaR and find that the differences of means among 
different groups are not always statistically significant. For example, there are no significant 
differences for the three groups in 2013, but in 2014, the Big-5’s mean of ∆CoVaR are 
significantly bigger than those of the National-8 and City-3. This reminds us that systemic risk of 
banks may be changing over time. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.2 Results for MES 
Table 5 shows the dynamic conditional correlations (DCC) between each bank and the banking 
system, the value at risk (VaR) at 5% quantile of each bank, and the MES of each bank during the 
whole sample period. We find that NBCB has the highest mean of MES among the 16 banks. 
Equity returns of NBCB will drop on average by 1.02% when the banking system’s return is 
below its VaR (5%). It should be noted that large banks, such as ICBC and ABC, have a relatively 
small MES, which means that their marginal contributions to systemic risk are relatively low. In 
addition, we find that there is not a high cross-sectional correlation between MES and DCC 
(correlation coefficient is 0.106), or between VaR and DCC (correlation coefficient is -0.109). 
However, the correlation coefficient between MES and the absolute value of VaR is as high as 
0.877. This suggests that banks with high VaR will suffer more from banking system distress. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
To observe the change in the banks’ rankings based on MES over time, Table 6 shows their 
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rankings during different periods. The last row of Table 6 presents the Spearman rank correlation 
between MES and bank size, both on an annual basis and for different periods. It appears that 
most rankings hardly change over time. For example, NBCB ranks first in all years but 2008, 
when it came out second. The five large-scale banks rank last since 2010, suggesting their 
relatively strong ability to avoid losses in case of banking system distress. Spearman rank 
correlations between bank size and MES vary between -0.78 and -0.66 since 2009, indicating a 
relatively high negative correlation between banks size and MES. In other words, a bigger bank 
tends to have a lower MES, contributing less to systemic risk of the banking system. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 7 shows the results for the three groups of banks according to the classification of the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission. It is clear that the MES of all three groups has decreased 
significantly in the second period compared to the first period. MES was the highest for all three 
groups in 2008; it decreased in the following four years, but rose again in 2013. In 2014, the MES 
of the three groups has declined to nearly half the average level of 2007-2010. The Big-5 banks 
have the smallest MES and the City-3 banks have the highest MES in all years except 2007. The 
t-tests show that the differences of the means among the different groups are statistically 
significant in all years except 2007. In other words, the City-3 banks have a significantly higher 
MES than the other two groups, which again reminds us to pay close attention to the systemic risk 
of small(er) banks. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
4.3 Results for SII 
We employ the SII approach to 14 listed banks14 in China for the full sample period. Table 8 
reports the results. To understand our findings, let’s take ICBC as an example. The estimated 
                                                             
14
 We exclude ABC and CEB, because these two banks were only listed in 2010 so that there are not enough 
observations to calculate the SII and VII measures. 
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systemic impact index of ICBC is almost 9, which suggests that almost 9 banks would fail if ICBC 
failed.  
We find that the most and the least systemically important banks are not the biggest or the 
smallest banks, but are medium-sized banks. SPDB and CNCB, which rank in sixth and seventh 
places in terms of bank size, are the most and the least systemically important banks according to 
the SII measure, respectively. This suggests that bank size is not a key element for banks’ systemic 
importance under this measure. Indeed, the Spearman rank correlation between bank size and SII 
is not significant (shown in the last row of Table 8). 
There is little variation among results of banks’ SII, and all banks’ SII show a relatively high 
systemic impact. This may be explained by their high correlations with the banking system, where 
their correlations are all higher than 0.8 (see the last second column in Table 2). We expect that SII 
values would show more dispersion if we had more banks and their correlations with the banking 
system would have been lower (Zhou (2010) shows that SII values of 28 U.S. banks range from 
6.53 to 12.44). 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
4.4 Results for VI 
We apply the VI approach to 14 listed banks in China for the full sample period. Table 9 presents 
the rankings as well as the Spearman rank correlation between the VI and bank. To understand the 
results, let’s take ICBC as an example. The value of the vulnerability index (VI) of ICBC is 35.8%, 
indicating that the probability of ICBC being distressed would be 35.8% if at least one other bank 
becomes distressed.  
We find that there is little variation of VI across different banks, and all VI values are higher 
than 33% showing a relatively high vulnerability. Furthermore, the Spearman rank correlation 
between bank sizes and VI is not statistically significant, as shown in the last row of Table 9, 
suggesting that large banks are not the most systemically important banks.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
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4.5 Comparing rankings under the four systemic risk measures 
There is no criterion which can be derived from theoretical or empirical research for comparing 
our measures for systemic risk. In addition, the measures used capture different aspects of 
systemic risk. We therefore compare the rankings of the banks considered based on different 
measures (see Table 10), and compute the pairwise correlations among the rankings (see Table 11). 
The comparison focuses on 14 banks 15  for the full sample period (from 09-25-2007 to 
12-31-2014). 
Table 10 shows that there is no bank having the same rank under the four measures. For 
instance, ICBC ranks fifth according to the ∆CoVaR, while it ranks 13th, eighth and third 
according to the MES, the SII and the VI, respectively. Still, the pairwise correlations of the 
rankings based on the ∆CoVaR, the SII and the VI are all above 0.6 and are significant at least at 
the 5 percent level, but all of them only have very weak relations with the ranking based on the 
MES measure (see Table 11). 
 
[Insert Table 10 and Table 11 here] 
 
To examine developments over time, we show average ∆CoVaR and average MES of all banks 
in Figure 5.16 In general, the movements of results of both measures are roughly aligned, 
indicating that systemic risk in the Chinese banking system tended to increase before the global 
financial crisis and reached a peak in October 2008. After the global financial crisis, systemic risk 
was relatively low. However, it began to rise in 2014, arriving at a relatively high level at the end 
of 2014. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
 
It is not surprising that different measures show similarities and differences as they have 
something in common but are not the same. Firstly, both ∆CoVaR measure and SII are used to 
                                                             
15
 We cannot estimate the SII and the VI for these two banks due to the limited number of observations for ABC 
and CEB, so the comparison of these four measures is based on 14 banks. 
16
 Here we do not provide time series results of the SII and the VI because there are no time series results for these 
two measures. 
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gauge the spillover effects from a bank to the banking system, while both MES and VI are used to 
capture banks’ capacity to cope with negative shocks in the banking system. Secondly, both 
∆CoVaR and MES weigh the magnitude of a loss, whereas both SII and VI emphasize the 
probability of distress. We argue that these two reasons can partly explain the similarities and the 
differences among the results of the measures. In addition, they may be associated with some 
bank-specific factors, such as the dynamic correlation between returns of banks and the market, as 
shown by Benoit et al. (2013).  
 
4.6 Comparison with Korean banks 
In this section, we compare our results of ∆CoVaR and MES for China with those for Korea 
presented by Yun and Moon (2014).17 The results shown in Table 12 for China and Korea refer to 
the same period, 2008-2013. We find that on average Chinese banks have a higher ∆CoVaR than 
Korean banks. The mean ∆CoVaR of China is nearly twice as high as that of Korea, which means 
that systemic risk of Chinese banks is much higher. In contrast, the mean MES of Chinese banks is 
lower than that of Korean banks, which suggests that the marginal systemic risk contribution of 
Chinese banks is lower than that of Korean banks. These findings suggest that ∆CoVaR and MES, 
even though both are viewed as systemic risk measures, do capture different aspects of systemic 
risk, which is in line with our analyses in Section 4.5. We also find that the similarities and the 
differences of our measures of systemic risk are country-varying. For instance, the rankings based 
on ∆CoVaR and MES have no significant correlation for Chinese banks while Yun and Moon 
(2014) find that they are highly correlated for Korean banks. Overall, our findings have the 
important policy implication that financial regulators should acknowledge the different meaning 
of different systemic risk measures, and that they should not rely on one single measure to identify 
systemic risk of banks. 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
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 We also found some studies using these two measures as well as SII and VI for US banks, but they focus on the 
period before or during the 2008 financial crisis while our research focuses on the period of 2008-2014. Because 
financial markets in China have structurally changed during the financial crisis (see Cheung et al., 2016), 
meaningful comparisons of our results and those for US banks cannot be made. 
 19
5. Conclusions and discussions 
In this paper we review the development of Chinese banks since the 1990s and study their 
systemic risk since the recent global financial crisis by employing CoVaR, MES, SII and VI 
measures to listed Chinese banks. The CoVaR and the MES are calculated based on Engle's (2002) 
DCC model which allows for capturing time-varying nature of the systemic risk exposures of 
individual banks, a merit not shared by the quantile regression method also used to estimate the 
original CoVaR measure in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). The SII and the VI measures have 
been derived using the extreme value theory framework, which can overcome the problem of the 
scarcity of crisis observations.  
We find that these four systemic risk measures yield different rankings for the banks considered, 
but correlations among rankings based on the ∆CoVaR, the SII and the VI measures are significant. 
We also find that these similarities and differences are time-varying. Despite the difference of 
∆CoVaR and MES with respect to the ranking of banks based on their systemic risk, they yield the 
same result that systemic risk in the Chinese banking system tended to increase during the global 
financial crisis and was relatively low after the crisis. However, systemic risk began to rise in 
2014, arriving at a relatively high level at the end of 2014. 
Finally, we compare our results of ∆CoVaR and MES for Chinese banks with those for banks in 
Korea. It shows that Chinese banks have higher ∆CoVaR but lower MES than Korean banks, 
implying that Chinese banks are systemic riskier and that they are more capable to avoid losses 
from banking system distress. An important policy implication is that financial regulators should 
acknowledge the different meaning of (changes in) ∆CoVaR, MES, SII and VI, and that they 
should not rely on one single measure. 
A major challenge of market-based systemic risk measures is that their effectiveness depends on 
market efficiency. Although the Chinese stock market is imperfect, some recent studies find that it 
has become fairly efficient after the reform in 2005-2006 (see Wang et al., 2010; Patel et al., 2012; 
Chong et al., 2012) and stocks are priced rather rationally (Eun and Huang, 2007). The increased 
efficiency of stock markets in China supports the use of these market-based systemic risk 
measures, as also evidenced by their use in other studies (see, for instance, Gang and Qian, 2015). 
Another concern is that some banks are partially owned by the government and therefore have a 
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low free float rate, which may affect the representativeness of their stock prices in measuring 
banks’ systemic risk. In our sample, the eight national joint-stock commercial banks and the three 
city joint-stock commercial banks are not owned by the government. Hence, our discussions focus 
on the five large-scale commercial banks (ICBC, CCB, ABC, BOC and BCM), which are partially 
owned by the Chinese government (represented by the Ministry of Finance and Central Huijin 
Investment Co Ltd). The government holds about 70%, 57%, 79%, 67% and 26.5% of stocks of 
ICBC, CCB, ABC, BOC and BCM, respectively. And the government-owned proportions hardly 
changed during our sample period, even during the 2015 stock market crash. We believe that as 
long as the government does not frequently buy and sell banks’ stocks with political purposes, 
banks’ stock prices can still be informative. In addition, even excluding the proportions owned by 
the government, the rest of the negotiable market capitalizations (hereafter, adjusted Cap) of ICBC, 
ABC, BOC and BCM are 360 billion, 196 billion, 239 billion and 164 billion Yuan, respectively. 
These four banks, in terms of their adjusted Cap, still rank in the Top 20 out of 2969 stocks in the 
Chinese stock market.18 Given their significant roles in the stock market, we have no reason to 
expect that these banks’ stock prices would become less informative due to their ownership 
structure. Also previous studies (like Gang and Qian, 2015) used stock prices of Chinese banks to 
construct systemic risk measures.   
All in all, we believe that these market-based systemic risk measures are informative and useful 
for China. We also advocate a thorough and systematic comparison of different measures of 
systemic risk in as many countries as possible. This would also make it possible to examine the 
similarities and differences amongst different systemic risk measures via panel models. 
 
  
                                                             
18
 For convenience and illustration, the market capitalizations are computed based on closing prices on October 25, 
2016. We certify that the conclusion is the same when we look into historical information in our sample period.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Assets and liabilities of the Chinese banking system 
 
Note: The unit of the assets and liabilities is trillion Yuan. The unit of the growth rate is percent. Source: China 
Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2013; and authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 2. Profits of the Chinese banking system 
 
Note: The unit of the profits is million Yuan. The unit of the growth rate is percent. Profits before taxes are shown 
for 2003- 2006 and after taxes for 2007- 2013 due to a change in statistical standard. Source: China Banking 
Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2013; and authors’ calculation. 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
total assets-LHS total liabilities-LHS
growth of total assets-RHS growth of total liabilities-RHS
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Profits-LHS Growth of Profits After Taxes-RHS
 26
Figure 3. Distribution of Banking Assets in 2013 
 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2013; and authors’ calculation. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Banking Profits after Taxes in 2013 
 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission Annual Report 2013; Authors’ calculation. 
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Figure 5. Average ∆CoVaR and Average MES of all sample banks 
Note: The units of the average ∆CoVaR and the average MES are percent. Source: authors’ calculation. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of daily log-returns of 16 Chinese banks 9/25/2007- 12/31/2014 
Banks Mean (%) Std. (%) Max (%) Min (%) Skew. Kurt. Obs. 
ICBC -0.001 0.021 0.139 -0.156 0.08 11.40 1765 
CCB 0.000 0.022 0.139 -0.152 0.06 9.87 1765 
ABC 0.051 0.014 0.104 -0.097 0.83 12.40 1050 
BOC -0.005 0.019 0.127 -0.125 0.44 10.82 1765 
BCM -0.018 0.023 0.108 -0.115 0.10 7.13 1765 
CMB -0.015 0.023 0.097 -0.105 0.02 6.27 1765 
SPDB 0.005 0.031 0.154 -0.157 0.04 7.34 1765 
CNCB -0.004 0.025 0.104 -0.111 0.18 6.20 1765 
CIB 0.002 0.028 0.107 -0.116 -0.03 5.56 1765 
CMBC 0.023 0.027 0.130 -0.140 0.06 6.85 1765 
CEB 0.017 0.019 0.107 -0.098 0.75 9.01 1050 
HB -0.002 0.030 0.127 -0.137 -0.10 6.33 1765 
PAB 0.004 0.029 0.102 -0.112 0.10 5.46 1765 
BOB -0.012 0.026 0.120 -0.132 -0.08 6.64 1765 
NBCB -0.016 0.028 0.120 -0.130 -0.04 6.24 1765 
BON 0.012 0.023 0.106 -0.107 0.17 5.96 1765 
Sector -0.004 0.019 0.096 -0.104 -0.01 7.77 1765 
Notes: Sector is Banking Sector Index. ICBC: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; CCB: China Construction Bank; ABC: 
Agricultural Bank of China; BOC: Bank of China; BCM: Bank of Communications; CMB: China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd; CNCB: 
China CITIC Bank; CIB: Industrial Bank Co., Ltd; SPDB: Shanghai Pudong Development Bank; CMBC: China Minsheng Banking Co., 
Ltd; CEB: China Everbright Bank; PAB: Ping An Bank; HB: Huaxia Bank; BOB: Bank of Beijing; BON: Bank of Nanjing; NBCB: Bank 
of Ningbo. Sample period is from 9/26/2007 to 12/31/2014 for all banks except for ABC and CEB, for which the sample period is from 
9/1/2010 to 12/31/2014. Banks listed in the first column are sorted in descending order of their average assets during the sample period. 
Source: authors’ calculations using data provided by TDX. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of ∆CoVaR, DCC and VaR (5%) 
Banks Mean (%) Std. (%) Max (%) Min (%) DCC Ave. VaR (5%) Ave. (%) 
ICBC 156.59 11.68 193.71 88.14 0.88 -3.05 
CCB 147.53 18.18 191.67 68.66 0.86 -3.21 
ABC 138.32 18.34 187.67 78.45 0.83 -2.12 
BOC 148.90 11.07 194.94 106.35 0.86 -2.82 
BCM 157.32 7.07 198.30 64.00 0.89 -3.50 
CMB 164.87 15.75 194.98 112.67 0.90 -3.55 
SPDB 166.85 13.40 196.86 120.18 0.91 -4.64 
CNCB 139.28 18.45 176.34 75.21 0.83 -3.89 
CIB 160.42 10.43 184.55 120.35 0.89 -4.41 
CMBC 152.59 20.32 194.97 78.01 0.87 -4.17 
CEB 136.41 20.22 203.72 24.44 0.82 -2.83 
HB 142.95 17.41 182.63 50.25 0.84 -4.58 
PAB 136.51 26.54 193.72 17.54 0.81 -4.42 
BOB 143.95 13.94 166.67 52.86 0.85 -3.93 
NBCB 132.36 13.69 161.54 69.57 0.81 -4.30 
BON 143.83 15.92 183.03 66.85 0.85 -3.71 
Notes: see Table 1 for abbreviations for the banks. Sample period is from 9/26/2007 to 12/31/2014 for all banks except for ABC and CEB, 
whose sample period is from 9/1/2010 to 12/31/2014. Banks listed in the first column are sorted in descending order of their average 
assets during the sample period. 
 
Table 3. Ranking of banks based on yearly average ∆CoVaR of each bank 
∆CoVaR 2007-10 2011-14 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ICBC 5 5 5 8 4 4 5 3 9 5 
CCB 7 11 9 6 5 7 9 13 14 8 
ABC -- 12 -- -- -- -- 13 16 11 6 
BOC 8 6 8 12 8 9 6 11 7 7 
BCM 6 3 4 7 7 5 2 4 3 4 
CMB 1 4 1 1 1 1 3 1 12 3 
SPDB 2 1 3 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 
CNCB 9 14 10 9 12 10 15 8 8 16 
CIB 4 2 2 4 3 6 4 5 2 2 
CMBC 3 10 6 3 6 2 11 10 4 11 
CEB -- 13 -- -- -- -- 16 12 13 12 
HB 12 8 12 10 9 12 10 7 6 9 
PAB 13 15 7 5 14 14 14 14 16 10 
BOB 11 7 14 13 10 8 7 6 10 13 
NBCB 14 16 13 14 13 13 12 15 15 15 
BON 10 9 11 11 11 11 8 9 5 14 
Spearman Correlation 0.57 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.58 0.46 0.32 0.14 0.06 0.58 
Notes: see Table 1 for abbreviations for the banks. Sample period is from 9/26/2007 to 12/31/2014 for all banks except for ABC and CEB, 
whose sample period is from 9/1/2010 to 12/31/2014. Banks listed in the first column are sorted in descending order of their average 
assets during the sample period. The last row shows the Spearman correlation between banks’ sizes and systemic importance. 
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Table 4. Yearly average ∆CoVaR of different banks groups (%) 
Groups 2007-2010 2011-2014 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Big-5 155.1 148.4 145.5 157.2 156.1 147.3 146.7 142.8 150.7 153.3 
National-8 154.4 144.3 141.3 166.4 153.3 142.3 139.4 144.7 149.7 143.7 
City-3 146.9 146.6 106.2 153.6 150.9 146.6 147.0 144.3 152.5 143.0 
Notes: Big-5 includes ICBC, CCB, ABC, BOC and BCM; National-8 includes CMB, SPDB, CNCB, CIB, CMBC, CEB, HB and 
PAB; City-3 includes BOB, NBCB and BON. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of MES, DCC and VaR (5%) 
Banks Mean (%) Std. (%) Max (%) Min (%) DCC Ave. VaR (5%) Ave. (%) 
ICBC 0.56 0.34 2.84 0.20 0.88 -3.05 
CCB 0.63 0.38 2.95 0.23 0.86 -3.21 
ABC 0.32 0.11 1.14 0.15 0.83 -2.12 
BOC 0.56 0.31 2.20 0.20 0.86 -2.82 
BCM 0.60 0.28 2.10 0.26 0.89 -3.50 
CMB 0.72 0.31 1.86 0.32 0.90 -3.55 
SPDB 0.83 0.46 2.78 0.29 0.91 -4.64 
CNCB 0.68 0.23 1.84 0.35 0.83 -3.89 
CIB 0.85 0.33 2.07 0.39 0.89 -4.41 
CMBC 0.84 0.40 2.56 0.31 0.87 -4.17 
CEB 0.35 0.16 1.23 0.18 0.82 -2.83 
HB 0.92 0.39 2.40 0.40 0.84 -4.58 
PAB 0.71 0.31 1.76 0.09 0.81 -4.42 
BOB 0.92 0.38 2.66 0.43 0.85 -3.93 
NBCB 1.02 0.38 2.65 0.46 0.81 -4.30 
BON 0.76 0.27 1.77 0.33 0.85 -3.71 
Notes: see Table 1 for abbreviations for the banks. Sample period is from 9/26/2007 to 12/31/2014 for all banks except for ABC and CEB, 
whose sample period is from 9/1/2010 to 12/31/2014. Banks listed in the first column are sorted in descending order of their average 
assets during the sample period. 
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Table 6. Ranking of banks based on yearly average of MES  
Banks 2007- 10 
2011- 
14 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ICBC 11 14 2 11 14 13 13 13 15 14 
CCB 10 12 8 9 9 12 11 12 12 13 
ABC -- 16 -- -- -- -- 16 15 16 16 
BOC 14 13 5 12 11 14 14 14 13 12 
BCM 13 11 12 13 12 11 12 11 11 11 
CMB 7 10 9 7 7 9 8 9 10 10 
SPDB 4 8 6 1 5 7 7 8 7 9 
CNCB 12 7 14 14 13 6 9 7 9 3 
CIB 6 4 3 6 6 4 4 5 2 6 
CMBC 5 5 4 5 4 8 6 6 3 5 
CEB -- 15 -- -- -- -- 15 16 14 15 
HB 3 3 7 3 2 3 2 2 5 4 
PAB 9 9 10 8 10 10 10 10 6 8 
BOB 2 2 11 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 
NBCB 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BON 8 6 13 10 8 5 5 4 8 7 
Spearman 
Correlation 
-0.68** -0.75** 0.09 -0.46 -0.66** -0.78** -0.73** -0.71** -0.69** -0.71** 
Notes: see Table 1 for abbreviations for the banks. Sample period is from 9/26/2007 to 12/31/2014 for all banks except for ABC and CEB, 
whose sample period is from 9/1/2010 to 12/31/2014. Banks listed in the first column are sorted in descending order of their average 
assets during the sample period. **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. The last row shows the Spearman correlation between 
banks’ sizes and systemic importance. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Yearly average MES of different banks groups (%) 
Groups 2007-2010 2011-2014 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Big-5 0.81 0.39 0.95 1.09 0.76 0.54 0.39 0.33 0.41 0.42 
National-8 0.99 0.57 0.9 1.35 0.93 0.72 0.55 0.47 0.73 0.55 
City-3 1.13 0.68 0.92 1.54 1.04 0.86 0.68 0.61 0.81 0.62 
Notes: Big-5 includes ICBC, CCB, ABC, BOC and BCM; National-8 includes CMB, SPDB, CNCB, CIB, CMBC, CEB, HB and 
PAB; City-3 includes BOB, NBCB and BON. 
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Table 8. Results for SII  
Banks SII Systemic Importance Ranking 
ICBC 8.9789 8 
CCB 9.0737 5 
BOC 8.6316 12 
BCM 9.3263 3 
CMB 9.4105 2 
SPDB 9.4842 1 
CNCB 8.5684 14 
CIB 9.2211 4 
CMBC 8.9895 7 
HB 8.9053 9 
PAB 8.6526 11 
BOB 9.0421 6 
NBCB 8.6105 13 
BON 8.6842 10 
Spearman Correlation -0.35 
Notes: SII is the systemic importance index, defined as the number of expected banks failures given a particular bank fails. See Table 1 
for abbreviations for the banks. Sample period is from 9/26/2007 to 12/31/2014 for all banks. Banks listed in the first column are sorted in 
descending order of their average assets during the sample period. The last row shows the Spearman correlation between banks’ sizes and 
systemic importance. 
 
Table 9. Results for VI  
Banks VI (%) Systemic Importance Ranking 
ICBC 35.80 3 
CCB 35.04 8 
BOC 33.73 12 
BCM 36.05 2 
CMB 36.29 1 
SPDB 35.55 5 
CNCB 33.73 12 
CIB 35.55 5 
CMBC 34.52 11 
HB 35.80 3 
PAB 33.20 14 
BOB 35.29 7 
NBCB 35.04 8 
BON 35.04 8 
Spearman Correlation -0.28 
Notes: VI is the vulnerability index, defined as the probability of failure given there exists at least another bank failure in the system. See 
Table 1 for abbreviations for the banks. Sample period is from 9/26/2007 to 12/31/2014 for all banks. Banks listed in the first column are 
sorted in descending order of their average assets during the sample period. The last row shows the Spearman correlation between banks’ 
sizes and systemic importance. 
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Table 10. Systemically important banks’ rankings in the full sample period 
Banks ∆CoVaR MES SII VI 
ICBC 5 13 8 3 
CCB 8 11 5 8 
BOC 7 13 12 12 
BCM 4 12 3 2 
CMB 2 8 2 1 
SPDB 1 6 1 5 
CNCB 12 10 14 12 
CIB 3 4 4 5 
CMBC 6 5 7 11 
HB 11 2 9 3 
PAB 13 9 11 14 
BOB 9 2 6 7 
NBCB 14 1 13 8 
BON 10 7 10 8 
 
 
 
Table 11. Pearson correlations among rankings of systemically important banks 
 
∆CoVaR MES SII VI 
∆CoVaR 1.00    
MES -0.24 1.00   
SII 0.85** 0.03 1.00 
 
VI 0.61* 0.08 0.70** 1.00 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
Table 12. Systemic risk in China and Korea: ∆CoVaR and MES 
Results Mean (%) Std. (%) Max (%) Min (%) 
∆CoVaR in this paper 148.4 11.1 168.1 131.6 
∆CoVaR in Yun and Moon (2014) 79.9 21.4 106.8 33.4 
MES in this paper 0.72 0.21 1.06 0.32 
MES in Yun and Moon (2014) 2.84 0.9 3.8 0.7 
Notes: ∆CoVaR (MES) in Yun and Moon (2014) are the mean ∆CoVaR (MES) of ten banks in Korea during 
2008-2013. ∆CoVaR (MES) in this paper reported here are the mean ∆CoVaR (MES) of 16 banks in China during 
2008-2013.  
 
